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Should Legal Malpractice Insurance Be 
Mandatory? 
As malpractice claims against lawyers multiply at an alarm- 
ing rate, individual attorneys are becoming increasingly con- 
cerned about having to defend possible malpractice claims 
against them and meeting the spiraling cost of legal malpractice 
insurance. State bar associations and the American Bar Associa- 
tion are currently studying what can be done about the situation.' 
As proposals to increase the availability and reduce the cost of 
malpractice insurance have been explored, it has been suggested 
that legal malpractice insurance coverage be required\as a neces- 
sary condition to the practice of 1aw.l 
This Comment will explore background material on the 
question of making legal malpractice insurance mandatory and 
include responses to a questionnaire on legal malpractice insur- 
ance that was submitted to all state bar associations. Recent 
relevant experiences of foreign and state bar associations will be 
discussed, and arguments for and against a mandatory legal mal- 
practice insurance proposal will be examined. In addition, the 
possible effects and problems of a mandatory program will be 
considered. 
A review of the establishment of clients' security funds is an 
appropriate starting point for a discussion of mandatory legal 
malpractice insurance for two reasons: (1) clients' security funds 
were designed to complement legal malpractice insurance cover- 
age, and (2) the arguments for and against clients' security funds 
and mandatory legal malpractice insurance are similar. Since 
1959, state and local bar associations have established funds to 
compensate clients for the dishonest acts of their  attorney^.^ 
Some of these funds are financed by mandatory contributions 
from all association members. Others are funded voluntarily. Al- 
though forty-eight states and the District of Columbia currently 
1. See Jericho & Coultas, Are Lawyers an Insurable Risk?, 63 A.B.A.J. 832, 835-36 
(1977); Woytash, Lawyer Malpractice: Is a Crisis Coming?, B. LEADER, Oct. 1976, at 18. 
2. See W. Gates, Mandatory Malpractice Insurance for Lawyers (Feb. 21, 1975) 
(paper presented at the meeting of the National Conference of Bar Presidents) (Gates is 
chairman of the ABA Special Committee on Lawyers' Professional Liability). 
3. Bryan, Clients' Security Fund Ten Years Later, 55 A.B.A.J. 757, 757 (1969). 
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have such funds,4 opinions originally were strongly divided over 
the wisdom of their establishment. 
Attorneys favoring the establishment of clients' security 
funds saw meeting a moral obligation to the public and the pro- 
fession as a primary reason for the funds? Such a fund, it was 
argued, was necessary in order to uphold the integrity and dignity 
of the pr~fession.~ Moreover, it was contended that a clients' secu- 
rity fund would improve the bar's reputation by compensating 
clients for their lawyers' dishonesty.' A third reason given was 
that the bar's failure to recognize its responsibility to the public 
in this area would result in public pressure toward legislation for 
such protecti~n.~ 
Commentators opposing clients' security funds replied that 
attorneys had no duty to pay for the defalcations of other law- 
yers .Thy should honest lawyers pay for the acts of dishonest 
attorneys? It would be better, these commentators argued, for the 
bar to use its energies in screening those admitted to the b a d 0  
The existence and operation of the funds arguably would publi- 
cize the dishonesty of lawyers and worsen public relations? 
Charges that such plans were unnecessary12 and would result in 
added expense to individual lawyers were also made.13 Moreover, 
the availability of such plans would possibly increase both dis- 
honesty charges against members of the bar and actions for mal- 
practice. l4  
As evidenced by the overwhelming number of states that 
have adopted clients' security funds, it  is apparent that the legal 
profession was more persuaded by the arguments favoring the 
funds' establishment. Although many of the same arguments 
4. Telephone interview with James H. Bradner, Assistant Director, Center for Profes- 
sional Discipline, American Bar Association (Sept. 15, 1977) (notes on file in the office of 
the Brigham Young University Law Review). 
5. See, e.g., Smith, The Client's Security Fund: "A Debt of Honor Owed by the 
Profession", 44 A.B.A. J. 125 (1958); Sterling, The Argument for a Clients' Security Fund, 
36 CAL. ST. B.J. 957, 957 (1961); Voorhees, The Case for a Clients' Security Fund, 42 J .  
AM. JUD. SOC'Y 155, 157 (1959). 
6. See, e.g., Atkins & Kane, Clients' Security Fund Maintains Bar's Integrity, 44 FLA. 
B.J. 130, 132 (1970); Scott, Some Pros and Cons of the Client Security Fund Proposal, 22 
THE SHINGLE 17, 18 (1959). 
7. Sterling, supra note 5, at 958. 
8. Id. at 959. 
9. See, e.g., McKnight, The Argument Against Clients' Security Fund, 36 CAL. ST. 
B.J. 963 (1961); Scott, supra note 6, a t  18. 
10. McKnight, supra note 9, at 963. 
11. See id. at 964. 
12. See Sterling, supra note 5, at 959. 
13. McKnight, supra note 9, at 966. 
14. Id. at 965. 
104 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1978: 
apply equally to the question of mandatory malpractice insur- 
ance, it is important to note that clients' security funds were not 
established to cover lawyer negligence as does malpractice insur- 
ance but rather to compensate for attorney defalcations. John W. 
Bryan, Jr., former chairman of the Louisiana and ABA commit- 
tees on clients' security funds, has made this clear: 
The Clients Security Fund is not a substitute for professional 
liability insurance as it does not cover negligence which is the 
risk insured against by the lawyer under the so called malprac- 
tice policy. 
Clients of lawyers with professional liability policies have 
no rights against the policy carrier because the standard form 
of policy excepts defalcation. The Clients Security Fund is a 
supplement to the malpractice insurance except that i t is  not in 
the nature of insurance but is a fund available for payments 
approved by the committee purely as a matter of grace and not 
of legal obligation either of the fund or the bar association.15 
Bryan's observation makes it evident that clients' security 
funds were designed to complement legal malpractice insurance 
coverage. Bryan has emphasized this interrelationship and the 
need for mandatory legal malpractice insurance to complete the 
security of the client: 
The theory of both the American and British funds is that a 
client is relegated to the malpractice insurance of the lawyer or 
to the lawyer's own resources in the case of the negligent han- 
dling of a client's matter as distinguished from a defalcation. 
It may be that some lawyers do not have this coverage. This 
insurance should be made compulsory as a condition of the priv- 
ilege of practicing law and as a way of completing the security 
of the client. l6 
Theoretically, then, a client would be protected from an attor- 
ney's negligence by legal malpractice insurance and from defalca- 
tions by a clients' security fund. Unfortunately, this ideal of com- 
plete protection has not yet been realized. 
Although nearly all state bar associations have provided pro- 
tection against a lawyer's defalcations with a clients' security 
fund, there is none that presently requires malpractice insur- 
15. Bryan, The Clients Security Fund in Louisiana-A Status Report, 16 LA. B.J. 
141, 145 n.3 (1968). 
16. Bryan, supra note 3, at 760. 
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ance.17 I t  is likely that as the number of malpractice claims 
against lawyers increase, especially against uninsured attorneys, 
state bar associations in the near future will give greater attention 
to the question of mandatory legal malpractice insurance. To 
ascertain the current opinions of state bar associations on the 
question of mandatory legal malpractice insurance and other re- 
lated issues, a questionnaire entitled "Yes-No Questions on Legal 
Malpractice Insurance" was sent to the executive directors of all 
state bar associations on September 27, 1977. In states that had 
both a voluntary and a unified bar,18 the questionnaire was sent 
only to the unified bar. Forty-seven of the fifty state bar associa- 
tions responded.I9 The results of the survey are summarized as 
follows:20 
Questions Number of Responses 
Don't No 
Yes No Know Response 
Is your bar association in 
favor of mandatory legal 
malpractice insurance ? 
a. members of the bar generally 4 10 32 1 
b. members of the governing 
board 7 11 26 3 
Does your bar association pre- 
dict tha t  mandatory legal mal- 
practice insurance will signifi- 
cantly increase malpractice 
claims against attorneys ? 
a. members of the bar generally 3 1 
b. members of the governing 
board 4 8 
Does your bar association 
sponsor a legal malpractice 
insurance program ? 42 5 -- 0 
Does your bar association 
have any plans to become 
self-insuring ? 2221 19 5 1 
17. Oregon will require legal malpractice insurance on July 1, 1978. See notes 49-53 
and accompanying text infra. 
18. North Carolina, Virginia, and West Virginia. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, 
1977/78 D~RECTORY 3G-5G (1977). 
19. The bar associations of Minnesota, New Mexico, and Oklahoma did not respond. 
20. The Review gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Larry C. Farmer, Rodney 
Jackson, and Gerald R. Williams in the preparation of the questionnaire and in the 
compilation of the responses. 
21. "Yes" answers include nine responses such as "studying self-insurance," etc. 
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5. Does your bar association 
have a clients' security fund? 44z2 
If yes, are you satisfied 
with your clients' security 
fund ? 34 
Are contributions to your 
clients' security fund 
mandatory ? 3423 
Which insurance 
underwrite legal 
Nunlber 
of 
Company Responses 
companies American Home Assurance 
malpractice Company 
insurance in your state? American Bankers In- 
surance Company of 
Florida 
St. Paul Fire and Marine 
Insurance Company 
Continental Casualty 
Company (CNA) 
Lloyd's of London 
GATX Insurance Con~pany 
Gulf Insurance Company 
Phoenix Insurance Company 
Transamerica Insurance . 
Group 
Percent 
26 
22 
8 
3 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
Nunlber 
Approximately what percentage 0-29 
of your attorneys are covered 30-39 
by legal malpractice insur- 40-49 
ance ? 2 4  50-59 
60-69 
70-79 
80-85 
No Response 
The large number of "Don't Know" responses to questions 1 
and 2 suggests a surprising lack of research and policy formula- 
tion concerning legal malpractice insurance. Many state bars 
22. "Yes" answers include cases where the clients' security fund is administered by 
the state supreme court rather than by the bar. 
23. "Yes" answers include cases where part of an attorney's dues or part of the bar 
budget goes to support the clients' security fund. 
24. Using the estimates provided by the state bar executive directors and the number 
of attorneys given in AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, 1976-1977 DIRECTORY OF BAR ASSOCIATIONS 
(1976), it is estimated that 55.42% of the attorneys in the 35 states responding carry 
malpractice insurance (149,190 out of 269,214). There is no external source to validate this 
estimate. An article published in 1970 cites various national estimates ranging from below 
50% to above 90%. Denenberg, Ehre, & Huling, Lawyers' Professional Liability Insurance: 
The Peril, the Protection, and the Price, INS. L.J., July 1970, at 392. 
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apparently have not yet confronted the issue of mandatory mal- 
practice insurance. Of the bar associations which answered either 
. yes or no to question 1, there was a split of opinion between the 
governing boards, with more opposing than favoring mandatory 
insurance. According to the estimates of the executive directors, 
bars with members generally opposing mandatory insurance out- 
numbered bars with members generally favoring such a proposal 
by more than two to one. When coupled with the finding that 
fewer than fifty-six percent25 of all attorneys have malpractice 
insurance, i t  appears tha t  many attorneys prefer the risk of 
"going bare" to the cost of either voluntary or mandatory insur- 
ance. 
Although there were many "Don't Know" responses to the 
questionnaire, certain correlations that can be inferred from the 
survey results help suggest why a particular bar association would 
be in favor of or opposed to mandatory insurance. One informa- 
tive relationship is that between bar size and support for or oppo- 
sition to mandatory insurance. This correlation is shown in Table 
1. 
TABLE 1.-Attitudes of Bar members  and governing boards toward 
mandatory  legal malpractice insurance a s  a fzcnction. of bar  size 
Bar Members Governing Boards 
Bar Size " Favoring Opposing No Opinion 5 Favoring Opposing No Opinion 
0-2000 0 5 8 2 6 5 
2000-5000 1 1 10 2 2 8 
5000-10,000 1 3 6 1 3 6 
over 10,000 2 1 8 
- - - 
2 
- 
0 
- 
7 
Total 4 10 32 7 11 26 
As Table 1 indicates, attorneys in bars with less than 2000 mem- 
bers reportedly are generally opposed to the idea of mandatory 
insurance. The least opposition and strongest support for manda- 
tory insurance was reported among lawyers in bars with member- 
ships over 10,000. By contrast, bar size was not as closely related 
to the governing boards' support for mandatory insurance as it 
was to the reported general opinions of bar members. Governing 
25. See note 24 supra. 
26. This category was based on the number of attorneys given in AMERICAN BAR 
ASSOCIATION, note 24 supra. 
27. The "No Opinion" category of Tables 1, 3, and 5 includes only "Don't Know" 
responses. 
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board opposition to mandatory insurance, however, was inversely 
related to bar size. 
The correlation between bar size and membership support 
for mandatory insurance may be the result of two factors. First, 
insurance administration costs and underwriting losses in a large 
bar can be distributed over a larger base, making mandatory 
insurance more feasible. Second, a bar association's ability to 
recognize intrinsic problems and to devise solutions may be re- 
lated to bar size. In showing a high correlation between bar size 
and associations with plans to become self-insuring, other survey 
results, set out in Table 2, partially support this latter assertion.28 
TABLE 2 . - ~ u k b e r  of bar  associations with plans to become self- 
insuring a s  a function of bar  size 
B a r  Size Bars  with plans Bars  without plans 2) 
0-2000 
2000-5000 
5000-10,000 
over 10,000 
Total 
Almost seventy-three percent" of the bars with memberships over 
10,000 reported plans to become self-insuring; less than eight 
percent3' of the bars with less than 2000 members reported self- 
insurance plans. 
A correlation, similar to that between bar size and support 
for mandatory insurance, may also be seen between bar type 
(unified, voluntary, or partially unified) and support for manda- 
tory insurance. As Table 3 shows, members of nearly fourteen 
percent of the twenty-nine unified bars reporting members' opin- 
ions were generally in favor of requiring legal malpractice insur- 
ance. The members of no voluntary bars were reported as gener- 
ally favoring mandatory insurance. 
28. This assumes, of course, that having a plan to become self-insuring demonstrates 
a bar's "ability to recognize intrinsic problems and to devise solutions." 
29. The "Bars without plans" category of Tables 2, 4, and 5 does not include cases 
where either a "Don't Know" or no response was made to the question. 
30. Of 11 bars with memberships over 10,000, eight reported plans to become self- 
insuring. 
31. Only one bar association (Idaho) out of 13 bars with memberships under 2000 
reported plans to become self-insuring. 
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TABLE 3.-Attitudes o f  bar  members  and governing bourds toward 
mandatory  legal malpract ice  insurance a s  a function of bar  t y p e  
Bar Members Governing Boards 
hTo No 
Ba r  Type :Z Favoring Opposing Opinion Favoring Opposing Opinion 
Unified 4 6 19 7 6 14 
Voluntary 0 3 13 0 4 12 
Partially Unified 0 
- 
1 
7 
0 
-- 
0 
- 
1 
- 
0 
- 
Total 4 10 32 7 11 2 6 
Table 3 also shows that among the governing boards of unified 
bars almost the same number of boards support the idea of man- 
datory insurance as reportedly oppose it. No voluntary bar gov- 
erning boards, however, were reported as favoring a mandatory 
program. 
One possible reason why neither the general memberships 
nor the governing boards of voluntary associations were reported 
in favor of mandatory insurance is the fact that a mandatory 
program is rather impractical where membership is on a volun- 
tary basis? A voluntary bar's governing board has little power to 
coerce the association's members to participate in a mandatory 
program. Such a program could also decrease new memberships 
in a voluntary bar. 
Another pattern derivable from the survey data is the rela- 
tionship between bar type and a bar's plans to become self- 
insuring. This correlation is shown in Table 4. 
TABLE 4.-Number o f  bar  associatio.m with plans to  become self-  
inszcring a s  a function o f  bar  t y p e  
Bar  Type Bars  with plans Bars  without plans 
- 
Unified 
Voluntary 
Partially Unified 
Total 
32. Classification of type of bar was based on AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, supra note 
18, at 1G-5G. 
33. Illinois State Bar Association reply to questionnaire. All responses to the ques- 
tionnaire are on file in the office of the Brigham Young University Law Review. 
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As Table 4 indicates, of the bar associations reporting plans to 
become self-insuring, nearly seventy-three percent are unified 
bars. The near-even split among voluntary bars over self- 
insurance plans may again be explained by the lack of power of 
voluntary bar governing boards to require membership participa- 
tion. 
The survey results indicate that bars with plans to become 
self-insuring are more likely to favor mandatory malpractice in- 
surance. If a bar plans to self-insure, there must be a fairly large 
number of participants to make the program feasible." In light 
of the correlation between bar size and reported membership sup- 
port for mandatory insurance, it is not surprising then that those 
bars considering self-insurance would also be likely to favor man- 
datory participation. Table 5 shows this result. 
TABLE 5.-Number of bar associations w i t h  plans to become se l f -  
insuring as  a function of the a t t i tudes  of bar members and governing 
boards toward mandatory legal malpractice insurance 
Attitudes toward mandatory insurance Bars  with plans Bars without plans 
Bar Members 
Favoring 
Opposing 
No Opinion 
Total 
Governing Boards 
Favoring 
Opposing 
No Opinion 
Total 
The survey also showed that bars requiring contributions to 
their clients' security funds were much more likely to be satisfied 
with those funds than were bars with voluntary-participation 
funds. Of the bars responding to the question on satisfaction with 
clients' security funds, nearly eighty-five percent of the bars with 
mandatory programs were satisfied; by way of contrast, only sixty 
percent of those bars with voluntary programs were satisfied. 
These results are shown in Table 6. 
34. To the extent that feasability of a self-insurance program is reflected in the plans 
of a bar association, this assertion is supported by the survey results in Table 2. See text 
accompanying note 28 supra. 
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TABLE 6.-Number of bar associations satisfied with their clie~lts' 
security funds as a function of the type of contribut.ion to clients' 
security fund 
- - 
Type of contribution Bar satisfied Bar not satisfied 
Mandatory 
Voluntary 
Total 35 
To the extent that satisfaction indicates success, the success of a 
clients' security fund apparently may be dependent on whether 
contributions to the fund are required.36 This dependency sug- 
gests that a malpractice insurance program to be successful 
would also need to be mandatory. This would be especially true 
where a bar self-insures because of the necessity of having a suffi- 
cient base over which to spread the risks. In light of the low 
percentage of attorneys presently either carrying malpractice in- 
surance or favoring the institution of mandatory insurance, i t  is 
unlikely that a voluntary program of bar-sponsored insurance 
would gain sufficient support to be successful. 
The fact that there were so many "Don't Know" responses 
to the questionnaire suggests a greater need for exploration of 
the legal malpractice insurance problem. Considerable current 
awareness of the mandatory insurance proposal, however, is 
indicated by the fact that eighteen state bar executive directors 
gave definite responses to the survey question regarding bar gov- 
erning board support for or opposition to the proposal. Although 
increased interest and research in this area are likely, it is diffi- 
cult to predict whether the result will be adoption or rejection of 
mandatory programs. 
III. RECENT EXPERIENCES IN MANDATORY LEGAL MALPRACTICE 
INSURANCE 
Although relatively few state bar associations are in favor of 
mandatory malpractice insurance, three states have attempted to 
adopt mandatory programs; one state bar has succeeded. In addi- 
tion, some foreign bar associations have required attorneys to 
- - 
35. Four bars did not respond to the question regarding satisfaction with clients' 
security funds. 
36. See Amster, Clients' Security Funds: The New Jersey Story, 62 A.B.A.J. 1610, 
1610 (1976). 
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obtain legal malpractice insurance coverage. This section reviews 
the experiences of these foreign and state bars. 
A. British Colum bia37 
Faced with dramatic increases in the cost of legal malprac- 
tice insurance, the Law Society of British Columbia developed a 
program to obtain insurance coverage for its members a t  reason- 
able rates. The Society had as its primary purpose the protection 
of its members. It realized, however, that the public would also 
be protected if every attorney was adequately insured. 
The Society recognized that, in order to implement and con- 
trol a malpractice insurance program, more was necessary than 
merely requiring each attorney to obtain malpractice coverage. 
Because the refusal of insurance companies to insure an attorney 
would bar him from practicing law, merely requiring each Society 
member to carry malpractice coverage would be equivalent to 
placing the power of deciding who would practice law in the 
hands of private insurance companies. In response to this prob- 
lem, the Society implemented a mandatory program38 under 
which all members would be insured by one insurer, but within 
which the Law Society and not the insurer would decide who was 
to be exempted or excluded. 
The program is partially self-insured, with the Law Society 
and the insured attorney jointly paying the first portion of every 
claim. The policy limit is $100,00039 per claim. Of this amount, 
each member pays a $3000 deductible per claim. The Society 
then pays the next $22,000 (in essence a $25,000 deductible to the 
insurer), and the insurer pays the remaining $75,000. The So- 
ciety's losses in any policy year are limited to $500,000. Any losses 
in excess of this limit are paid by the insurer regardless of the 
amount .* 
The program provides malpractice coverage to all the So- 
37. The information in this section is based on a letter from and telephone interview 
with T.V. McCallum, Secretary of the Law Society of British Columbia. Letter from T.V. 
McCallum to Thomas L. Kay (Oct. 14, 1977) (on file in the office of the Brigham Young 
University Law Review); telephone interview with T.V. McCallum (Oct. 19, 1977) (notes 
on file). 
38. The Canadian law societies have far more power to implement programs than do 
their American counterparts. They need no judicial or legislative approval to put a plan 
such as mandatory insurance into effect. Telephone interview with T.V. McCallum (Oct. 
19, 1977) (notes on file in the office of the Brigham Young University Law Review). 
39. All dollar amounts in this section are in Canadian currency. 
40. The insured attorney must still pay the first $3000 of each claim, however. Tele- 
phone interview with T.V. McCallum (Feb. 20, 1978) (notes on file in the office of the 
Brigham Young University Law Review). 
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ciety's members at a very reasonable cost. Before the program 
went into effect on January 1, 1971, with Travelers Insurance 
Companies as the carrier, only forty percent of the Society's 
members had malpractice coverage. Today, except for those who 
are exempted from the insurance requirement, such as govern- 
ment and corporation employees, each member of the Society has 
$100,000 per claim coverage for $300 per yeard1 Out of this $300 
assessment, the Law Society pays both the program's operating 
costs and the insurer's premiumd2 and covers the $500,000 loss 
limit. 
The Society's involvement in the program, both in a finan- 
cial sense and through an active loss prevention program, demon- 
strates to the insurer that the Society and its members take a 
strong interest in the viability of the insurance program. The 
Society's involvement has made it possible to identify the sources 
of claims and to implement effective loss prevention measures. 
For example, after finding that thirty-three percent of all claims 
(fifty percent in dollar figures) arose from statute of limitations 
problems, especially the one-year statute of limitations of British 
Columbia's motor vehicle act, the Law Society devised and mar- 
keted a diary system that could be implemented in each law 
office. The Society also lobbied to increase the motor vehicle act 
statute of limitations period from one year to two years. Another 
thirty percent of claims were found to come from title search 
problems. In response to this problem, the Society developed a 
title search form for its members. Problems with mechanic's liens 
constituted the third largest number of claims. The Society has 
warned its members against the pitfalls of the mechanic's lien act 
and has also lobbied for its change. 
In addition to mandatory insurance, the Law Society has a 
Special Fund, equivalent to a clients' security fund, that reim- 
burses clients for the dishonest acts of their lawyers. The Society 
has noted an improvement in its public image since the adoption 
of the Special Fund and mandatory insurance. The public is now 
assured that no client will be unprotected. Knowledge of the in- 
surance requirement by the public and by attorneys, however, 
has apparently led to an increase in the number of malpractice 
claims. This increase may also be explained by the fact that some 
- - -- 
41. Additional coverage can be obtained for a modest cost. For example, an extra 
$900,000 coverage over the $100,000 mandatory limit would cost $160 per year. Thus, 
$1,000,000 of coverage would cost $460 per year. 
42. Since 1976 the insurer has been GESTAS, a Canadian consortium of eight insur- 
ance companies operating out of Montreal. 
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lawyers may have become more careless in their practice because 
they know they are covered by insurance.43 
The British Columbia Law Society feels that its program has 
been very successful on the whole. Nonexempt members and their 
clients are protected for what is reported to be one-sixth to one- 
seventh the cost of equivalent, individually acquired coverage 
written by a commercial carrier. Because of the success of the 
British Columbia program, nine of the ten other Canadian law 
societies have adopted similar mandatory programs.44 
The Norwegian Clients' Compensation Fund encompasses 
coverage for both malpractice and dishonesty. Established by the 
Norwegian Bar Association (Den Norske Advokatforening) in 
1969, the fund is, in effect, a combined malpractice insurance 
program and clients' security fund. The fund is controlled by a 
council of three members, two appointed by Den Norske Advo- 
katforening and one appointed by the Ministry of Justice. The 
program, administered by the Secretariat of Den Norske Advo- 
katforening, requires each lawyer to contribute approximately 
$40 per year. 
The fund is to be used in the council's discretion to cover any 
liability that  a lawyer may incur as a result of his own or his firm's 
illegal conduct in the course of professional activities. Claims due 
to negligence may also be met by this fund. In order to be granted 
any compensation from the council, however, the client must first 
establish in court the attorney's liability for the dishonest or neg- 
ligent act. After establishing the legal basis for the claim, the 
client may apply to the council for compensation. The council 
then determines the amount of compensation to be paid, if any. 
Generally, full compensation will be paid if the fund has the 
means to do so. The council's decisions are final and cannot be 
appealed in the courts. After compensating the client, the fund 
has the right to make a claim against the lawyer concerned. 
43. The first $3000 of each claim must still be paid by the insured lawyer, however. 
44. The Bar of Quebec has not adopted a mandatory program. Telephone interview 
with T.V. McCallum (Feb. 20, 1978) (notes on file in the office of the Brigham Young 
University Law Review). Reportedly, the programs adopted by the other nine law societies 
(including the one established by the Chamber of Notaries in Quebec) have experienced 
results similar to those of British Columbia. Telephone interview with T.V. McCallum 
(Oct. 19, 1977) (notes on file). 
45. The information in this section is based on a letter from Kristen S. Fari, Secretary 
of Den Norske Advokatforening. Letter from Kristen S. Fari to Thomas L. Kay (Sept. 20, 
1977) (on file in the office of the Brigham Young University Law Review). 
1021 MANDATORY LEGAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE .I15 
Washington was apparently the first state to consider imple- 
mentation of a mandatory malpractice insurance program. In 
1973, the Board of Governors of the Washington State Bar made 
a firm decision to institute such a program. A poll that year of 
the bar's membership had shown that seventy-two percent of 
those attorneys responding were in favor of the idea of mandatory 
malpractice insurance. The local bar presidents approved the 
idea in 1974 and urged its implementation. The State Bar Insur- 
ance Committee, however, was neither willing nor prepared to 
effectively implement the program a t  that  time. 
The Board of Governors instead instructed the bar staff to 
explore the alternatives available in the market place. Many in- 
surance brokers made presentations to the staff. Some brokers 
had fully developed plans; others suggested that the Board of 
Governors select an experienced broker and then take some time 
to develop specifications before signing up a carrier. The Board 
decided to take the latter approach. 
A Board committee was formed and, together with a broker, 
developed a plan that was later accepted by the Argonaut Insur- 
ance Company. The plan's essential elements were announced to 
the bar in August 1974. The program was to provide $1,000,000 
coverage, with no deductible, for an annual premium of $155. The 
policy year and mandatory requirement were to begin on Febru- 
ary 1, 1975. The policy, an "occurrence" and not a "claims made" 
type," would not have given the insurer the right of individual 
cancellation. The insurer was committed to underwrite the pro- 
gram for two additional years with no more than a ten percent 
premium increase. 
In conjunction with this announcement, the Board of Gover- 
nors recommended that the Washington Supreme Court adopt a 
new rule requiring malpractice insurance coverage as a condition 
of practicing law. Bylaws were also established to make the pro- 
gram effective February 1, 1975, and to exempt certain attorneys 
from the insurance requirement. Those opposing the program 
made presentations to the court. One large county bar association 
46. The information in this section is based on that in W. Gates, note 2 supra. 
47. An "occurence" type of policy covers acts, errors, or omissions committed during 
the policy period regardless of when the claim is made. A "claims made" type of policy, 
by contrast, covers acts, errors, or omissions for claims presented during the policy period. 
For a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of these two types of policies, see 
R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, LEGAL MALPRACTICE g g  459-460 (1977); Comment, The "Claims 
Made" Dilemma in  Professional Liability Insurance, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 925 (1975). 
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adopted a resolution opposing the program. 
Before the debate could be resolved, however, a death blow 
was struck to the program when, in late October 1974, Argonaut 
was forced to withdraw because its parent corporation, Teledyne, 
had suffered enormous underwriting and investment losses. As a 
result, the mandatory program had to be postponed. The Wash- 
ington Supreme Court was requested to defer its action on the 
proposed rule. A second poll was then conducted to determine the 
feelings of the bar's membership. Of the 2,830 attorneys who 
responded (out of 6,000 members), sixty-three percent were in 
favor of requiring legal malpractice insurance; however, only 
forty-two percent wanted the Board of Governors to continue its 
efforts to develop a compulsory insurance contract with a single 
carrier. Presently the Washington State Bar Association is con- 
sidering the possibility of self-insurance? 
The Oregon State Bar has gone further than any other state 
bar association in implementing a mandatory legal malpractice 
insurance program. At their 1976 annual meeting, the members 
of the bar voted to authorize the Board of Governors to seek 
legislation authorizing a compulsory liability fund. The bill 
drafted and sponsored by the Board, Senate Bill 190, was passed 
by the Oregon Legislature and signed into law by Governor 
Straub in mid-1977. The new law authorizes the Board of Gover- 
nors "to require all active members of the state bar engaged in 
the private practice of law in Oregon to carry professional liability 
insurance . . . . "50 
The Board responded to the law's enactment by adopting a 
resolution establishing the Oregon State Bar Professional Liabil- 
ity Fund. The resolution requires "all active members of the Ore- 
gon State Bar engaged in the private practice of law" to carry, 
beginning July 1, 1978, "professional liability coverage with ag- 
gregate limits of not less than $100,000"51 that will be offered by 
the Professional Liability Fund. The fund, to be managed by a 
Board of Directors consisting of seven active members of the Ore- 
gon State Bar engaged in private practice and appointed by the 
Board of Governors, will evaluate, investigate, negotiate, and de- 
48. WASH. ST. B. NEWS, June 1977, at 19. 
49. The information in this section is largely based on Statement of the Board of 
Governors, Oregon State Bar, Professional Liability Fund (1977 Annual Meeting). 
50. ORE. REV. STAT. 9 9.080(1) (1977). 
51. Statement of the Board of Governors, supra note 49, at 8. 
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fend claims. The initial assessment for the period from July 1 
through December 31, 1978, will be $250 per lawyer. New lawyers 
admitted to practice after September 1, 1977, will be assessed 
$125. Coverage will be on a "claims made" basis with a $100,000 
limit on all claims arising out of the same act, subject to a maxi- 
mum liability of $200,000 per coverage period. House counsel, 
public defenders, legal aid lawyers, and government attorneys 
will be excluded from the insurance req~i rement .~~  In addition, 
patent lawyers will be required to furnish evidence of comparable 
coverage with a private carrier, although they will not be required 
to subscribe to the fund. 
The Oregon Bar anticipates that the plan will produce 
greater protection of the clients and the public, greater protection 
for the lawyer, and continued availability of professional liability 
protection at  a reduced cost.53 The absence of a profit factor and 
the utilization of a detailed recordkeeping system and loss pre- 
vention program should result in the Professional Liability Fund 
costing attorneys far less than comparable commercial insurance. 
Other reasons for reduced costs are the elimination of advertising 
costs and brokers' commissions, the elimination of unnecessarily 
large accumulations of reserves, and broad participation by all 
attorneys to spread the costs. 
The experience of the Oregon State Bar in the future will be 
helpful to other state bar associations in formulating their own 
mandatory insurance programs. The success of the Oregon pro- 
gram is likely to influence other bars to implement mandatory 
self-insurance programs. Under a program like Oregon's Profes- 
sional Liability Fund, mandatory coverage will be necessary to 
provide an adequate base over which to spread the risks. 
E. California 
California, like Oregon, attempted to create an alternative to 
private insurance. However, where Oregon succeeded, California 
failed. California's attempt came in the form of a bill sponsored 
in the state legislature by Assemblyman John T. K n ~ x . ~ ~ n o x ' s  
Assembly Bill 209 was designed to offer relief from the high cost 
of malpractice insurance by establishing the California Client 
Protection Fund, a public corporation that would exist within the 
52. See ORE. REV. STAT. F) 9.080(4) (1977). 
53. ORE. ST. B. BULL., Aug. 1977, at 6. 
54. See Knox, A. B. 209: "Alternative to Private Insurance", STATE B. CAL. REP., July 
1977, at  1, 4. 
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state's judicial branch of government. This fund was to be main- 
tained by requiring yearly contributions from the bar. Unlike 
private insurance, most of which is written on a "claims made" 
basis, contributions would be based on the amount paid out to 
clients in the previous year. This "claims paid" formula was a 
unique idea to professional liability coverage. The first-year 
(1978) contribution was to be $400 per attorney. The limit of 
coverage was to be $250,000 per occurrence, with an aggregate 
total of $500,000 per contribution period. 
Knox's bill sparked a vigorous debate among California at- 
torneys. Knox's supporters, seeing no reasonable alternative to 
the proposal, viewed the reduced cost to attorneys and the in- 
creased public protection as primary reasons for adopting the 
proposed legislation. The fund should be mandatory, these sup- 
porters argued, because it would be unconscionable to allow an 
attorney to practice without providing for his clients' financial 
security.55 
The bill's opponents argued that the plan was being sold on 
the basis of an artifically low initial contribution. They viewed 
the "claims paid" structure as being financially unsound. Such 
a fund, incorporating an extreme cost deferral, has the potential 
for weakening the legal profession and subjecting it to ultimate 
state control, they said. Opponents also contended that manda- 
tory participation was undesirable because it forced a lawyer into 
an "untried social experiment." Other, superior alternatives were 
said to be available a t  comparable overall costs? 
Assemblyman Knox finally withdrew the proposed Client 
Protection Fund provision from the bill and converted it into a 
proposal for a special study of attorney malpractice and client 
protection. This action came after the Los Angeles and San Diego 
county bar associations voiced their opposition to the bill and 
after a statewide attorney plebiscite conducted by the state bar 
showed that only a slim majority supported the proposal.57 Thus 
diluted, the bill was passed by the California Legislature, but was 
vetoed by Governor Brown on October 3,1977. Brown's veto mes- 
sage stated that the bill "contemplates compulsory insurance for 
one professional group. Compulsory insurance inevitably leads to 
a state fund, a prospect we should think about long and hard."58 
55. Cotkin, Arguments for A.B. 209-Attorneys Professional Responsibility Fund, 
STATE B. CAL. REP., July 1977, at 7. 
56. Miller, Arguments Against A.B. 209-Attorneys Professional Responsibility 
Fund, STATE B. CAL. REP., July 1977, at 5. 
57. STATE B. CAL. REP., Aug. 1977, at 1. 
58. Press Release from Office of the Governor of California (Oct. 3, 1977) (quoted in 
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IV. THE ARGUMENTS 
Considering the many state bar associations that have ap- 
parently not yet decided to support or oppose the mandatory legal 
malpractice insurance proposal, a review and analysis of the ar- 
guments for and against such a proposal may be valuable. The 
following arguments will deal mainly with mandatory proposals 
with one insurer or with self-insurance.59 
A. Financial Protection of Clients and Attorneys 
As has been noted above,60 legal malpractice insurance com- 
pletes a client's protection when coupled with an existing clients' 
security fund. Although it may be unconscionable for a lawyer to 
practice law without first providing financial security for his 
clients," many lawyers have chosen to "go bare.'' It is estimated 
that less than fifty-six percent of all attorneys have malpractice 
i n s ~ r a n c e . ~ ~  When large numbers of attorneys choose not to pro- 
vide for their clients' protection, the bar arguably should require 
that all lawyers obtain insurance coverage as a privilege of prac- 
ticing law. 
Opponents may argue that there are few unsatisfied mal- 
practice claims against lawyers and that a mandatory program 
should not be imposed where there has been no significant prob- 
lem. Although unsatisfied claims against lawyers are not yet a 
matter of general public attention, bar associations need not 
await "scandal or public outcry" before bringing about needed 
reform.63 Requiring attorneys to obtain malpractice coverage 
would assure that no client would go without a remedy for an 
attorney's negligence. 
Requiring malpractice insurance would not only provide fi- 
nancial security to the client but would also protect the attorney. 
Lawyers engaged in private practice without malpractice insur- 
ance risk financial disaster from even a minor inadvertence?If 
STATE B. CAI.. REP., O d .  1977, a t  14). 
59. Some of the following arguments would be somewhat different if, rather than a 
mandatory self-insurance or sole-insurer program, there was merely an insurance require- 
ment for all attorneys. Requiring all attorneys to obtain insurance might induce more 
companies to write legal malpractice insurance policies, thus increasing the number of 
insurers from which lawyers might choose. An increased number of competing insurance 
companies soliciting business might arguably result in a reduction in the cost of insurance. 
60. Notes 15-16 and accompanying text supra. 
61. Cotkin, supra note 55, at 8. 
62. Note 24 supra. 
63. W. Gates, supra note 2, a t  2. 
64. Neil, A Realistic Response to the Professional Liability Insurance Problem, ORE. 
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the attorney's financial protection were the only consideration, 
the bar might have no responsibility to require that all lawyers 
carry malpractice insurance. When coupled with the bar's re- 
sponsibility to protect the public, however, the protection of the 
bar's members further justifies implementation of a mandatory 
program. 
B. Cost 
Any consideration of a proposal to remedy the existing mal- 
practice insurance situation must deal with the proposal's effect 
on the cost of insurance? If a mandatory program is more expen- 
sive then existing insurance, the proposal will obviously be far 
more difficult to adopt. By contrast, a mandatory program less 
expensive than existing insurance alternatives would come as a 
welcome relief to the present state of soaring insurance pre- 
miums. 
Proponents of mandatory insurance argue that a mandatory 
program will reduce the cost of malpractice coverage. The in- 
crease in the number of attorneys insured will spread the risk over 
a broader base and thus arguably reduce the cost? Opponents 
contend that the inclusion of lawyers presently uninsured in the 
base will not necessarily reduce the cost. It is possible that the 
lawyers without insurance are actually those most prone to mal- 
practice claims because they are poor risks and cannot afford the 
resulting high premiums. Requiring these lawyers to have insur- 
ance, opponents argue, will make premiums even higher because 
there will be an increase in the number of claims that will out- 
weigh the advantage of a larger base of insureds. 
There are other reasons why coverage should cost less under 
a mandatory program, however. Administration of a mandatory 
program would yield information about the sources and causes of 
malpractice claims. That information could be used to imple- 
ment loss prevention programs that would have the longrun effect 
of decreasing the number of claims made?' States that adopt a 
professional liability fund, such as Oregon's self-insurance plan, 
ST. B. BULL., Mar. 1977, at 5. See also Dixon, 'Going Bare' May Be Hazardous to Your 
Fiscal Health, J .  LEGAL MED., Nov.-Dec. 1976, at 23. 
65. This section will deal only with the cost of insurance to attorneys. Arguably, the 
cost of services to clients should also be considered since under a mandatory program a 
client who wanted to save money and was willing to bear the risk of employing an unin- 
sured attorney would be prevented from doing so. It is unlikely, however, that the cost of 
services to a client would vary greatly between insured and uninsured attorneys. 
66. Note 53 and accompanying text supra. 
67. W. Gates, supra note 2, at 4. See also text accompanying note 74 infra. 
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would also have decreased costs because of the elimination of 
advertising expenses, profit margins, brokers' commissions, and 
unnecessary reserves .6s 
Opponents also maintain that knowing the existence of com- 
pulsory coverage will cause people who might not otherwise make 
a claim to do SO? Lawyers, they argue, will be less hesitant to 
bring actions against other lawyers. The number of increased 
claims from these two sources will in turn increase premiums. 
The experience of British Columbia has shown that mandatory 
coverage may be accompanied by increased claims.'O Even with 
an increase in the number of claims, however, lawyers in British 
Columbia pay substantially less for insurance than they report- 
edly would if they had to obtain coverage without a mandatory 
program.71 The Oregon State Bar also projects a dramatic 
decrease in costs with its mandatory program.72 
C. Public Image 
The self-imposition of an insurance requirement in recogni- 
tion of the public interest, it is argued, will improve the bar's 
public imagen by making certain that the public will be compen- 
sated for attorney malpractice. A bar-imposed mandatory pro- 
gram covering all lawyers will show that attorneys are sincerely 
interested in the welfare of their clients and the public. 
Pointing to the problem of increased claims caused by public 
awareness of insurance coverage, opponents may argue that mak- 
ing malpractice coverage compulsory is a public admission by the 
bar that attorneys are often negligent. It seems more probable, 
however, that any detrimental effect such an "admission" might 
68. See text accompanying note 53 supra. 
69. SPECIAL COMMIT~EE ON LAWYERS' PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIA- 
TION, LEGAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE: A PRIMER FOR THE ORGANIZED BAR 153 (1977). See also 
Johnson, Malpractice: My One-man Battle to Go Bare, MED. ECON., Feb. 7, 1977, at 120. 
70. See Letter from T.V. McCallum to Thomas L. Kay (Oct. 14, 1977) (on file in the 
office of the Brighum Young University Law Review). Each state bar may also determine 
if establishing a clients' security fund has increased dishonesty claims against lawyers. 
71. See id. 
72. See text accompanying note 53 supra. 
Related to the cost argument is the contention that a client should be permitted to 
choose whether to employ an insured or uninsured attorney. In effect, granting the client 
such a choice gives him the option of selecting the services of an uninsured lawyer (pre- 
sumably for a lower fee) and thus bearing the risk of having an unsatisfiable malpractice 
claim against his attorney. While such an argument may have some force when the client 
is financially sound enough to bear the potential loss, the contention loses its vitality when 
poor or nonaffluent clients are involved. 
73. W. Gates, supra note 2, a t  2. 
122 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1978: 
have on the bar's reputation would be more than offset by the 
improved public image caused by the indirect showing of concern 
for clients' protection made by adoption of a mandatory program. 
D. Malpractice Loss Prevention 
As noted above, the administration of a mandatory legal 
malpractice insurance program will provide a state bar associa- 
tion with information that will aid in malpractice prevention. 
Loss prevention is the best way to  attack the roots of the legal 
malpractice problem; information about the causes of losses is 
essential to a plan for prevention. Because of the small percentage 
of attorneys that have insurance and the fact that insurance com- 
panies pool several states together for risk spreading reasons, 
there are no accurate figures on the causes of a state's malpractice 
problems. Often a large number of claims in State A will have a 
direct result on premiums in State B.74 
Only under a mandatory program of self-insurance or with 
one insurer, it is argued, can a bar effectively discover the causes 
of its malpractice problems. One commentator contends, how- 
ever, that simply involving the bar in claims handling would give 
a bar the information it needs.75 In Wisconsin, for example, each 
attorney policyholder agrees that information about any claim 
asserted against him may be reviewed by the bar's insurance 
committee. This system allows the bar to compile information on 
problem areas and to implement educational programs where 
necessary. Proponents argue that,  under a mandatory self- 
insurance or one-insurer program, premiums can be made to re- 
late directly to a state's own loss experience. As a result of the 
direct effect losses would have on premiums, lawyers and bar 
associations would be more involved in loss prevention under a 
mandatory program than otherwise. British Columbia's experi- 
ence with a mandatory program is again illustrative. There, the 
Law Society, through experience gained in the program's admin- 
istration, identified the three largest causes of claims and then 
worked to remove those causes. The Society devised practical 
systems to prevent lawyer negligence and lobbied for changes in 
those laws that often caused malpractice problems. 
74. For example, "[olne legal malpractice insurer sought the same substantial 
premium increase last year [I9761 in Oregon, Washington and Idaho, even though there 
had been no claim at all against any of its insured lawyers in Idaho in the preceding year." 
Neil, supra note 64, at  5. 
75. Stanley, President's Page, 63 A.B.A.J. 155 (1977). 
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The variety of possible loss prevention measures extends be- 
yond the British Columbia experiences. One writer has this vision 
of other possibilities: 
I can see State Bar Journal articles describing case histories 
and statistical analyses of causes of losses and, more impor- 
tantly, checklists and procedures for loss avoidance. I can see 
continuing legal education seminars on the subject. I can also 
see an increase in the occasions for the consistently careless 
lawyer to become involved in his bar's disciplinary processes. In 
short, as local loss experience becomes a matter of direct signifi- 
cance to each local lawyer's pocketbook the business of loss 
control is going to receive more effective at tent i~n. '~  
These and other measures will be made possible or encouraged by 
mandatory insurance and will have positive effects in reducing 
the size of the legal malpractice problem.77 
E. Threat of Legislative Enactment 
Failure of the bar to require legal malpractice insurance of 
its members, it is argued, may result in action by the legislature. 
The failure of many doctors to carry coverage has resulted in 
several states now requiring doctors to have malpractice insur- 
ance in order to pra~tice. '~ If a large number of lawyers continue 
to practice law without insurance while the incidence of malprac- 
tice suits increases, similar legislation for the legal profession may 
well result.7g A legislatively enacted program prompted by the 
bar's failure to act is likely to be less favorable to the bar than a 
bar-created program. For example, if the legislature simply made 
malpractice insurance a requirement of practicing law, there 
would be no cost savings or way to identify losses and implement 
a loss prevention program. In addition, such legislation would be 
accompanied by public attention to the failure of lawyers to pro- 
tect their clients from negligence and unsatisfied judgments, 
thereby resulting in unfavorable publicity for the bar. 
76. W. Gates, supra note 2, at 4. 
77. All this is not to say that bar associations cannot identify the causes of malprac- 
tice without implementing a mandatory insurance program. Because of the larger base of 
insureds and the increased amount of bar involvement in program administration, the 
identification of sources of malpractice would likely be easier under a mandatory program. 
78. See Goldberg, Malpractice: Can the States Outlaw Going Bare?, MED. ECON., 
Dec. 13, 1976, at 31. 
79. See also Why the Malpractice Crisis Has to Get Worse to Get Better, MED. ECON., 
Jan. 24, 1977, at 47. 
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F. Constitutionality 
The constitutionalitys0 of a compulsory legal malpractice in- 
surance requirement or program may well be attacked in the 
courts. The primary issue would be whether the insurance re- 
quirement was an unconstitutional interference with the oppor- 
tunity of practicing the legal profession. This issue will probably 
be resolved in the same way as it has been in the medical context. 
Several recent medical malpractice insurance cases demon- 
strate the reception met by doctors' challenges to insurance re- 
quirements. For example, in Pollock v. Methodist Hospital, s1 the 
federal district court upheld a hospital requirement that a physi- 
cian carry malpractice insurance as a condition of his employ- 
ment a t  the hospital. The court dismissed the doctor's due pro- 
cess challenge, observing that the 
plaintiff has no liberty or property interest sufficient to invoke 
the due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
While the right to practice an occupation is a liberty interest 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, . . . plaintiff is not 
precluded from exercising that right by the insurance require- 
ments of the defendant hospital. He need only comply with the 
requirements in order to continue his membership on the hospi- 
tal staff. . . . This consideration is sufficient to dispose of 
plaintiffs possible property interest as 
In Jones v. State Board of M e d i ~ i n e , ~ ~  both physicians and 
hospitals brought an action for declaratory judgment as to the 
constitutionality of Idaho's Hospital-Medical Liability Act. The 
doctors contended that the Act's malpractice insurance coverage 
requirement constituted a denial of due process because it imper- 
missibly deprived them of their constitutional right to pursue a 
recognized profession. Although the Idaho Supreme Court agreed 
that the pursuit of an occupation was a liberty and property 
interest to which the due process protections of the state and 
federal constitutions attached, the court stated that the power to 
require doctors to carry malpractice insurance was clearly within 
the state's police power. The court compared the insurance re- 
80. The validity of the manner of adoption of the mandatory requirement or program 
may also be at issue. Because of the wide variations in state laws and procedures regarding 
adoption of such an insurance proposal, a discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of 
this Comment. 
81. 392 F. Supp. 393 (E.D. La. 1975). 
82. Id. at 396 (citations omitted). 
83. 97 Idaho 859, 555 P.2d 399 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977). 
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quirement to the bonding requirement of other trades and profes- 
sions. The court observed that the 
requirements of obtaining medical malpractice insurance as a 
condition to licensure bear a rational relationship to the health 
and welfare of the citizens of the state by providing protection 
to patients who may be injured as a result of medical malprac- 
tice and to this extent does not violate the guarantees of due 
process of laweS4 
There has been only one case to date invalidating a manda- 
tory medical malpractice insurance program. In McGuffey v. 
the constitutionality of legislation enacted by the Ken- 
tucky General Assembly, similar to that of the Idaho Legislature 
in Jones, was challenged in two separate declaratory judgment 
actions. The court viewed the purpose of the legislation to be 
three-fold: (1) to increase the availability of malpractice insur- 
ance, (2) to reduce the cost of malpractice insurance, and (3) to 
assure that medical malpractice judgments and settlements 
would be satisfied. Noting both that the requirement of malprac- 
tice coverage did not increase the availability nor reduce the cost 
of insurance and that there was no prior history of unsatisfied 
claims against doctors or hospitals, the court held, on state (not 
federal) constitutional grounds, that the legislation was an unjus- 
tified exercise of the state's police powerY 
As McGuffey demonstrates, it is possible that, absent proof 
of unsatisfied claims and an increase in the availability and re- 
duction in the cost of insurance, legislation that only mandates 
insurance coverage for lawyers may be struck down as in conflict 
with a state's constitution. Any mandatory program, however, 
reasonably related to the accomplishment of its purposes should 
satisfy both state and federal constitutional challenges. 
G.  Conflict of Interest 
Arguably, a mandatory program will create a conflict of in- 
terest within the bar. The conflict, it is argued, arises as a result 
of two factors: (1) the direct effect losses will have on malpractice 
premiums, and (2) the bar's interest in keeping down both the 
number and size of claims. The mere fact that an attorney is 
among the insureds in a self-insured or one-insurer mandatory 
program arguably may mean that he has a conflict of interest 
84. Id. at 868, 555 P.2d at 408. 
85. 557 S.W.2d 401 (Ky. 1977). 
86. Id. at 414. 
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when involved in prosecuting a legal malpractice case because the 
defendant attorney and both counsel would be covered by the 
same program or insurer. 
However, the fact that the defendant, the defendant's attor- 
ney, and the plaintiffs attorney are all covered by the same pro- 
gram or insurer, and nothing more, should not create a substan- 
tial ethical problem. Under either a mandatory program or the 
presently existing systems, the ethical conflict is too indirect to 
be considered a problem in itself. It would be necessary to show 
that the plaintiffs counsel, for the purpose of keeping malprac- 
tice premiums down by limiting the plaintiff's recovery, had ei- 
ther inadequately represented his client or colluded with the de- 
fense counsel. 
Indeed, with respect to this possible ethical problem, there 
is not a great difference between a mandatory self-insurance or 
sole-insurer program and the situation in a legal malpractice case 
today. Presently, because of the limited number of malpractice 
carriers, there is a good possibility that the defendant lawyer and 
attorneys for both sides will be insured, if at all, by the same 
company. Even if the defendant lawyer and the attorneys are 
each insured by different companies, the overall result may be 
similar. This results because a rate increase granted the defen- 
dant's insurer to compensate for its large loss may apply to other 
insurers as well. 
H. Choice of Insurer 
Opponents also contend that a mandatory program could 
result in limiting an attorney's choice of ins~rer .~ '  This argument 
is especially forceful where a state bar self-insures or insures with 
only one carrier. The choice-of-insurer argument, however, loses 
some of its force when applied to new attorneys and other attor- 
neys who are obtaining malpractice insurance for the first time. 
Currently only two companies are actively soliciting new busi- 
ness? Thus, there is not a great deal of choice even at  present. If 
87. SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON LAWYERS' PROFESSIONAL LI BILITY, supra note 69, at 152. 
88. The companies are American Bankers Insurance Company of Florida (generally 
through the brokerage of Shand, Morahan & Company, Inc.) and American Home Assur- 
ance Company. Id. at 15-16; see T. Sheehan, The History of Lawyers Professional Liability 
Insurance 3-4 (Aug. 10, 1977) (paper presented at the annual meeting of the ABA Section 
of Insurance, Negligence and Compensation Law, Showcase Program for Lawyers, Chi- 
cago, Illinois). Other companies, however, continue to provide renewal coverage. The 
Arkansas, California, Chicago, Florida, and Illinois bar associations have on-going insur- 
ance programs with various other insurers. Lloyd's of London will write policies on an 
individual risk basis; this type of coverage is most frequently used by the larger law firms. 
SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON LAWYERS' PROFESSIONAL LI BILITY, supra note 69, at 16. 
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a state bar, however, simply requires all attorneys to carry mal- 
practice coverage, rather than requiring participation in a man- 
datory self-insurance or one-insurer program, such action argua- 
bly will create a market and induce more insurers to offer cover- 
age, thereby actually increasing the attorney's choice of insurers. 
One of the strongest arguments for requiring legal malprac- 
tice insurance is that relating to the financial protection of 
clients. Because currently only a low percentage of attorneys 
carry adequate malpractice insurance, there is a substantial risk 
that clients may suffer unremedied malpractice-caused financial 
injurie~.~' The counterargument is that there is presently no need 
for a mandatory insurance program in light of the small number 
of unsatisfied judgments against  attorney^.^ Attorneys, it is con- 
tended, should not be compelled to purchase insurance where 
there has been little, if any, evidence of injury to the public. 
Lawyers as a profession, however, have a responsibility to act 
before there is a public outcry or legislative enactment. 
The cost of insurance arguably will be less under a manda- 
tory program. The effect that an increase in the number of attor- 
neys insured will have on the cost of insurance is disputed. The 
increased base may reduce the cost by spreading the risk. On the 
other hand, including lawyers in the base that are presently unin- 
sured may increase the number of poorer risks and thus increase 
the cost. In addition, clients and attorneys may be less hesitant 
to sue attorneys for malpractice, knowing that all attorneys are 
insured. The experience of the Law Society of British Columbia, 
however, indicates that a mandatory program may reduce the 
cost of legal malpractice insurance. 
Another argument in favor of mandatory insurance is that 
loss identification and prevention will be facilitated by a manda- 
tory program. Loss identification and prevention measures, it is 
true, can be implemented without imposing an insurance require- 
ment. Nevertheless, these measures will be easier to implement 
under a mandatory program. The direct effect a bar's losses will 
--  
89. To the extent that increasing numbers of malpractice claims indicate a greater 
incidence of malpractice, the risk to clients may actually be growing. 
90. The number of unsatisfied judgments may be a poor indicator of the degree of 
public injury caused by attorney malpractice, however. Many injured clients may choose 
to bear the loss rather than prosecute a malpractice action to its conclusion. Moreover, 
the negotiation process may result in only partial remedies for injured clients who do bring 
actions but settle them. 
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have on its attorneys' premiums will also be a strong motivator 
to make a loss prevention program work. 
In light of the increased financial protection afforded clients, 
the possible reduction in insurance cost, and the better opportu- 
nity to reduce malpractice through loss identification and pre- 
vention programs, it seems reasonable to impose a legal mal- 
practice insurance requirement on practicing attorneys. 
VI. IMPLEMENTATION OF A MANDATORY PROGRAM 
Once the decision is made to adopt a mandatory legal mal- 
practice insurance program, a bar association must face some 
additional decisions in implementing its program. This section 
reviews a few of these  decision^.^^ 
A. Type of Mandatory Program 
Each bar that adopts a mandatory program, as opposed to a 
simple insurance requirement, must decide whether to imple- 
ment i t  with a commercial carrier or through some other alterna- 
t i ~ e , ~ ~  such as a self-insurance fund as in Oregon or a combination 
of self-insurance and commercial insurance as in British Colum- 
bia.93 Because few insurance companies are currently writing new 
legal malpractice policies, a bar association's options may be lim- 
ited. Added to this limitation is the fact that insurers are appar- 
ently unwilling to forego their underwriting discretion as a man- 
datory program might demand. Representatives of American 
Bankers Insurance Company of Florida and American Home As- 
surance Company, the only two companies writing new policies, 
have expressed such an un~i l l ingness .~~  Since a mandatory pro- 
91. A bar must also decide on the (1) amount deductible, (2) amount of coverage 
required, (3) exclusions from coverage, (4) procedure for enacting the requirement (legisla- 
tion or supreme court petition), (5) type of coverage (claims made, occurrence, etc.), and 
(6) availability of excess coverage over the minimum requirement. 
92. SPECIAL COMMIT~EE ON LAWYERS' PROFESSIONAL LI BILITY, supra note 69, at 109; 
Stern & Martin, Solutions to the Attorney Malpractice Insurance Crisis, BARRISTER, Fall 
1977, a t  44. 
93. Implementation of the British Columbia system in the United States would raise 
significant questions of insurance law, particularly if the bar associations had to qualify 
as insurance companies under state law. Stanley, supm note 75, a t  155. The Oregon 
Professional Liability Fund, i t  should be noted, will be exempt from that state's insurance 
code. See ORE. REV. STAT. $ 9.080(1) (1977). 
94. Telephone interview with Allan Pither, Vice President of American Bankers In- 
surance Co. of Florida (Oct. 6, 1977) (notes on file in the office of the Brigham Young 
University Law Review); telephone interview with Leo J. Gilmartin, Representative of 
American Home Assurance Co. (Oct. 5, 1977) (notes on file). 
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gram would require that all active members of the bar be able to 
obtain coverage from the carrier,95 implementation of such a pro- 
gram with a commercial carrier would necessitate overcoming the 
companies' hesitancy. It is possible that either company would 
alter its position if presented with a program similar to that of 
British Columbia with its large deductible feature. 
If a commercial carrier will not forego its underwriting discre- 
tion, a state bar association will be confronted with a dilemma. 
If the bar requires each attorney to carry malpractice insurance, 
the insurance companies in effect will be controlling who prac- 
tices law in that state. An insurance company's decision not to 
insure an attorney would effectively bar him from practice. If, as 
is probable, the bar association is unwilling to cede that power 
to the insurer, it may be impossible to implement a mandatory 
program through a commercial carrier. 
One alternative to this dilemma is for the bar to self-insure. 
Many state bar associations have plans to self-insure or are study- 
ing the possibility." The experience of Oregon's self-insuring fund 
and those of other states that adopt this alternative will provide 
useful information as to the viability of self-insurance. 
B. Exemptions 
If a mandatory program is instituted, a state bar must also 
decide which attorneys will be exempted from the insurance re- 
quirement. The plans proposed in Oregon, California, and Wash- 
ington all suggest decisions different in form but substantially the 
same in effect. 
Oregon's self-insuring professional liability fund excludes 
house counsel, public defenders, legal aid lawyers, and govern- 
ment lawyers. Although patent attorneys are not required to con- 
tribute to the fund, they will be required to provide evidence of 
similar coverage?' This exception for patent attorneys is based on 
their practice's unique nature and on the availability of similar 
coverage through a national a s so~ ia t ion .~~  
95. SPECIAL C O M M I ~ E  ON LAWYERS' PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY, supra note 69, at 152. 
96. See text accompanying note 21 supra. 
As might be expected, some insurance executives do not think self-insurance is a 
viable alternative for most bar associations. Telephone interview with Allan Pither, Vice 
President of American Bankers Insurance Co. of Florida (Oct. 6, 1977). In Pither's view, 
many attorneys and bar associations think there is something "magic" about self- 
insurance. Pither also indicates that a bar association needs at least 5,000 members to be 
able to self-insure effectively. At present, only 24 associations are over that threshold. See 
note 24 supra. 
97. Statement of the Board of Governors, supra note 49, at 2. 
98. Id. 
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The original California proposal, Knox's unamended bill, 
excluded attorneys employed by any governmental agency or en- 
tity; state, local, or federal officers; and any lawyer representing 
only his employer.gg This employer category would have included 
corporations, labor unions, cooperatives, and other similar enti- 
ties. 
Washington's proposed plan basically excluded attorneys 
who had no more than one client.loO In dealing with the problem 
of who constitutes a client, the Washington bar decided that 
donated legal work for a nonprofit organization would not make 
that organization an additional client. 
Each program seems to have the same underlying policy, i. e., 
that certain attorneys ;re not generally subject to malpractice 
claims and therefore should not be required to carry malpractice 
insurance. It does not seem to make much difference whether this 
policy is expressed in terms of attorneys not in private practice 
or attorneys who have only one client. 
C. Bar Defense and Discipline of Insured Attorneys 
Another problem, more subtle in nature, may occur under a 
mandatory self-insurance program. The problem arises when a 
self-insuring bar defends a malpractice claim against one of its 
members; in such a situation, the bar may be ethically prohibited 
from using information obtained in that defense in a subsequent 
disciplinary proceeding against the attorney involved.lo1 While 
the problem may arise under a voluntary self-insurance program, 
it is more likely to occur under a mandatory system. 
The problem, however, can be avoided if the bar association 
retains outside firms to defend malpractice claims. Information 
thus obtained by defense counsel would be protected by the 
attorney-client privilege, and its disclosure would violate a disci- 
plinary rule.lo2 In order to prevent this problem from arising, a bar 
should retain a firm to do its defense work and remind the firm 
In addition to excluding certain attorneys, Oregon will also assess new bar members 
only one-half of the regular contribution required under the program to be implemented. 
Requiring a lower premium of new attorneys appears reasonable in light of the straitened 
financial circumstances of most new attorneys. 
99. Knox, supra note 54, at 4. 
100. W. Gates, supra note 2, at 7. 
101. It is likely that more vigorous disciplinary action will be taken against the 
consistently careless or incompetent lawyer under a mandatory program. See text accom- 
panying note 76 supra. 
102. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(B). 
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that it has no duty to reveal to the bar information obtained in 
the process of defending malpractice claims. 
Legal malpractice and malpractice insurance are serious 
problem areas. The cost of malpractice insurance continues to 
increase dramatically. As a result attorneys are going without 
insurance and more are likely to "go bare" in the future. As more 
attorneys practice without insurance coverage, the public stands 
a greater chance of suffering an unremediable injury at the hands 
of a negligent attorney. 
Practicing law is a privilege that carries with it responsibili- 
ties. Mandating legal malpractice insurance will help lawyers 
protect themselves and the public. Making insurance mandatory 
may significantly reduce premiums. More important, however, is 
the possibility that loss control programs made possible by a 
mandatory program will significantly reduce legal malpractice. 
The more directly the bar and its members are involved, the 
greater the likelihood of reducing the incidence of legal malprac- 
tice. 
As each state bar association considers plans for providing 
malpractice coverage for its members, serious consideration 
should be given to a mandatory program. The benefits of such a 
program appear to greatly outweigh the detriments. 
Thomas L. Kay 
